A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus.
Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a finite set of players and for any subset (coalition) of players a worth representing the total payoff that the coalition can obtain by cooperating. A payoff vector is a vector which gives a payoff to each of the players, i.e., each component corresponds to precisely one of the players. A payoff vector is efficient if the sum of the payoffs is equal to the worth of the grand coalition consisting of all players. A set-valued solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors (possibly empty) to every TU-game. A single-valued solution assigns precisely one payoff vector to every TU-game. A solution is said to be efficient if for every game any payoff vector assigned by the solution is efficient. The most well-known efficient set-valued solution is the Core (Gillies, 1953) . The two most well-known efficient single-valued solutions are the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) .
In this paper we assume that the players in a TU-game are part of some hierarchical structure that is represented by a directed graph such that some players need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a coalition. In the literature two approaches to these games with a permission structure can be found. In the conjunctive approach, as considered in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996) , it is assumed that each player needs permission from all its predecessors in the directed graph before it is allowed to cooperate. Alternatively, in the disjunctive approach as developed in Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997) , a player needs permission to cooperate of at least one of its direct predecessors (if it has any). So, according to the conjunctive approach a coalition is feasible if and only if for any player in the coalition, all its predecessors are also in the coalition, whereas according to the disjunctive approach a coalition is feasible if and only if for any player in the coalition at least one of its predecessors (if it has any) is also in the coalition. Following an approach similar to that of Myerson (1977) for games with limited communication (graph) structure, in both the conjunctive and disjunctive approach to games with a permission structure a restricted game is derived. In games with a permission structure the restricted game assigns to every coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset. Applying well-known solutions as the Shapley value, Core or nucleolus to such restricted games yields solutions for games with a permission structure.
A special subclass of games with a permission structure arises from peer group situations, as introduced in Brânzei, Fragnelli and Tijs (2002) . A peer group situation is a triple consisting of a set of players, a hierarchical structure represented by a rooted (directed) tree, and for each player a non-negative real number representing its potential individual (economic) contribution to the society of all players. This yields an associated TU-game being the additive game in which the worth of any coalition is equal to the sum of the individual potentials of its members. In a rooted directed tree there is one top node (not having a predecessor), while any other node has precisely one predecessor. So, in case the hierarchical structure on the player set is a rooted directed tree, the conjunctive approach and the disjunctive approach as described above, coincide. The restricted game of the associated TU-game with respect to such a permission structure is called a peer group game. These peer group games have many interesting applications, see Brânzei et al. (2002) . Clearly, in a peer group game the worth of a coalition is the sum of the individual potentials of the members of the largest feasible subset of the coalition. Since the top player is always in this set when it belongs to the coalition, and the largest feasible set is the empty set for any coalition not containing the unique top player, it follows that the top player is a veto player, i.e., any coalition not containing the top player has zero worth in the restricted game. In this paper we generalize peer group games by considering non-negative additive games on acyclic permission structures (which are not necessarily trees). Consequently, these games need not to contain a veto player 1 .
In Arin and Feltkamp (1997) an exponential time algorithm has been given for veto-rich games, i.e., games that have at least one veto player. For the special case of a peer group game a polynomial time algorithm is given in Brânzei, Solymosi and Tijs (2005) and for a class of games satisfying so-called weak digraph monotonicity and weak digraph concavity conditions with respect to acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structures, a polynomial time algorithm is given in van den Brink, Katsev and van der Laan (2008) . This latter class of games is more general than the class of peer group games, but the acyclic permission structure is still required to be quasi-strongly connected. In this paper we provide a polynomial time algorithm to compute the nucleolus of the restricted game induced by situations in which the associated TU-game is still additive, but in which we allow for any acyclic permission structure, so allowing more than one top player. This considerably widens the applications, for example we can consider situations where sellers can sell objects to buyers through a directed network of intermediaries. Wherease quasistrongly connected networks only can be used for situations with one seller, weakening this by only requiring that the network is acyclic, we can also study such situations with more than one seller. The algorithm presented in this paper computes the nucleolus in polynomial time through a number of iterations. In each iteration a subgame with an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure is considered and the algorithm developed in van den Brink et al. (2008) is used to compute the nucleolus for this subgame. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section containing cooperative TU-games (with special attention for the nucleolus), directed graphs and games with a permission structure. In Section 3 we provide the algorithm to find the nucleolus for disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure. Section 4 shows that the algorithm indeed computes the nucleolus for this class of games. In Section 5 we discuss some properties of the algorithm, while Section 6 discusses its complexity, showing that it indeed finds the nucleolus in polynomial time. Section 7 illustrates the algorithm with an example of a market situation where sellers can sell objects to buyers through a directed network of intermediaries. Finally, there is an appendix with the algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) that is used in each iteration of the algorithm to compute the nucleolus of a non-negative additive subgame with an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure.
Preliminaries

TU-games
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperating can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a pair (N, v) , where N ⊂ IN is a finite set of n players and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N, v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e., the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoff of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. For simplicity, for a single player i we denote its worth v({i}) by v(i). When there is no confusion about the player set N we often denote the game (N, v) just by its characteristic function v. We denote the collection of all characteristic functions on N by G N and n = |N| denotes the cardinality of N . Further, for game v ∈ G N and coalition K ⊆ N we define
A payoff vector for a game is a vector x ∈ IR n assigning a payoff x i to every i ∈ N .
In the sequel, for S ⊆ N we denote x(S) = i∈S x i . A payoff vector is efficient if x(N ) = v(N ) and it is individually rational if x i ≥ v(i) for every i ∈ N . The imputation set I(N, v) of game (N, v) is given by
i.e., I(N, v) is the set of all efficient and individually rational payoff vectors. A (set-valued) solution F on G N assigns a set F (N, v) ⊂ R n of payoff vectors to every characteristic function v ∈ G N . The most well-known set-valued solution is the Core assigning to every
i.e., it is the set of all imputations that are stable in the sense that no coalition can do better by separating from the grand coalition. The Core of (N, v) is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced, see e.g. Bondareva (1962) or Shapley (1967) . Another (set-valued) solution is the Kernel assigning to every v ∈ G N the set
i.e., the set of all imputations such that for each pair of players i and j the complaint s ij (x) = max{v(S) − x(S) | i ∈ S, j ∈ S} of i against j is at least equal to the complaint of j against i, with equality whenever j gets more than its individual worth v(j). A solution F is said to be single-valued if it assigns to any v ∈ G N a unique payoff vector. One of the two most well-known single-valued solutions is the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) . 2 To define the nucleolus, consider a given characteristic function v ∈ G N , and let
x ∈ IR n be a payoff vector. Then the excess e(S, x) of a coalition S ⊆ N is defined by
Further, let E(x) be the (2 n − 2)-component vector that is composed of the excesses of all coalitions S ⊂ N, S = ∅, in a non-increasing order, so
Then the nucleolus N uc(N, v) of the game (N, v) is the unique imputation which lexicographically minimizes the vector-valued function E(·) over the imputation set. Formally,
where L denotes the lexicographic order of vectors. It is well-known that N uc(N, v) ∈ K(N, v) and that Nuc(N, v) ∈ C(N, v) when C(N, v) = ∅. So, when the game has a nonempty Core, then the nucleolus is in the intersection of the Kernel and the Core. In a game (N, v), a coalition S is called inessential if it has a partition {S 1 , . . . , S r } with r ≥ 2, such that v(S) ≤ r j=1 v(S j ). Coalitions which are not inessential are called essential. Notice that single player coalitions are always essential. It is straightforward to observe that for an inessential coalition S it holds that
Therefore the Core, and thus also the nucleolus, is independent of inessential coalitions, as was noticed by Huberman (1980) . In fact, in any n player game there are at most (2n − 2) coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus, see Brune (1983) and Reijnierse and Potters (1998) . However, as noticed by Brânzei et al. (2005) , identifying these coalitions is no less laborious as computing the nucleolus itself.
Directed graphs
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N, D) where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of nodes (representing the players) and D ⊆ N × N is a binary relation on N . Given (N, D) and S ⊆ N, the graph (S, D(S)) is the subgraph on S given by D(S) = {(i, j) ∈ D|i, j ∈ S}.
In the sequel we simply refer to D for a digraph (N, D) and to D(S) for the subgraph (S, D(S)). For i ∈ N the nodes in S D (i) := {j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ D} are called the successors of i, and the nodes in P D (i) := {j ∈ N | (j, i) ∈ D} are called the predecessors of i. For a set T ⊆ N, let S D (T ) = ∪ i∈T S D (i) denote the union of the sets of successors of the players in T , respectively P D (T ) = ∪ i∈T P D (i) the set of all predecessors the players in T . Further, T D = {i ∈ N | P D (i) = ∅} denotes the set of top nodes in D, being the set of nodes not having a predecessor. For given D on N , a path between i and j in N is a sequence of distinct nodes
there is a path between any two nodes in T that only uses arcs between nodes in T , i.e., if for every i, j ∈ T there is a path (i 1 , . . . , i m ) between i and j such that {i 1 , . . . , i m } ⊆ T . A component in D is a maximally connected set T of nodes, i.e., T is connected and T ∪ {i} is not connected for every
For a set of nodes T ⊂ N and i ∈ T , we call a directed path (i 1 , . . . , i m ) a path from T to i if i 1 ∈ T and i m = i. For every (directed) path p = (i 1 , . . . i m ) we denote the set of nodes on that path by 
A digraph is called quasi-strongly connected if there exists a node i 0 ∈ N , such that for every j = i 0 there is a directed path from i 0 to j. When D is, moreover, acyclic then T D = {i 0 }, i.e., i 0 is the unique top node in N . A quasi-strongly connected digraph D ∈ D N is a rooted directed tree with the root being the top node i 0 if there is precisely one path from top-node i 0 to every other node. By S D (i) we denote the set of nodes that can be reached from i by a directed path, i.e., j ∈ S D (i) if and only if there exists a sequence of players (h 1 , . . . , h t ) such that of node i ∈ N in D if every path from T D to j contains node i. The set of complete subordinates of node i is denoted by S D (i), i.e.,
Also we call the players in the set
Restricted games
In this paper we assume that the players in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical structure that is represented by a directed graph, refered to as a permission structure, such that some players need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a coalition. A triple (N, v, D) with (N, v) a TU-game and (N, D) a digraph with the player set N as the set of nodes is called a game with a permission structure. In the sequel we
As noticed in the introduction we can distinguish between the conjunctive and disjunctive approach. In this paper we consider the disjunctive approach as developed in Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997) , where a player needs permission to cooperate of at least one of its direct predecessors (if it has any). Therefore a coalition is feasible if and only if for any player in the coalition at least one of its predecessors (if it has any) is also in the coalition. So, for permission structure (N, D), the set of disjunctive feasible coalitions is given by
4 By Assumption 2.1 we have that for every S ⊆ N with σ(S) = ∅, the subgraph
, under the disjunctive permission structure the induced restricted game r : 2 N → R is given by
If |T D | = 1 then D is quasi-strongly connected and for the unique top player i 0 it holds that r(S) = 0 when i 0 ∈ S, i.e., the restricted game is a veto-rich game with top-player i 0 as veto player. 5 If D is a rooted directed tree, then |P D (i)| = 1 for all i = i 0 and the conjunctive and disjunctive approach coincide. In this case the triple (N, v, D) is a peer group situation when the game (N, v) is a non-negative additive game (see Brânzei et al. (2002) ), i.e., there exist non-negative real numbers a i , i ∈ N , such that
Then the restricted game (N, r) as defined in (2.1) is a so-called peer group game and is given by
A peer group game (N, r) is a monotone veto-rich game and has a non-empty Core. In particular the payoff vector x ∈ IR n + given by x i 0 = v(N ) and x i = 0, i = i 0 , belongs to the Core. On the other hand it holds that r(S) ≤ i∈S a i and thus also the payoff vector x ∈ IR n + given by x i = a i for all i ∈ N belongs to the Core. As noticed in Brânzei et al. (2002) , this class of games with permission structure contains several interesting applications. Also the two games v and its restriction r are games as considered in Ni and Wang (2007) to study polluted river games. In particular, their LR polluted river is a non-negative additive game, and their DR polluted river game is the restriction R of this game on the permission structure that represents the linear ordering of the players along the river from upstream to downstream.
A polynomial time algorithm for the nucleolus based on quasi-strongly connectedness
In the remaining of this paper we consider a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v, D). Since σ(S) ⊆ S for any S ⊆ N, also in this case we have that r(S) = v(σ(S)) ≤ i∈S a i . Therefore the payoff vector x ∈ IR n + given by x i = a i for all i ∈ N is in the Core and thus the Core is nonempty and contains the nucleolus.
We first show that for any non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v, D), there exists a subset K ⊆ N with the properties that (i) the subgraph (K, D(K)) is an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure and (ii) j∈K x j = j∈K a j for any payoff vector x ∈ IR n in the Core of the restricted game (N, r), so also for the nucleolus. These properties play an important role in an algorithm to compute the nucleolus of the restricted game obtained from a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v, D) . In fact the nucleolus is obtained by computing the nucleolus of a sequence of smaller non-negative additive games with quasistrongly connected permission structures. By definition the properties hold for K = N when the graph has only one top player. So, in the sequel of this section we only consider the case that |T D | ≥ 2. The first lemma is obvious and stated without proof.
Lemma 3.1 For every acyclic permission structure (N, D) it holds: j is a (complete) superior of i if and only if i is a complete subordinate of j.
For a top player t ∈ T D , let the set U t be defined by S D (t) ∪ {t}, i.e., U t contains top player t together with all its complete subordinates. Observe that
i.e., the set U i ⊂ N is the union of all players on all directed paths from top player t to its complete subordinate i. Then we have the next lemma.
Lemma 3.2 Let (N, D) be an acyclic permission structure, t ∈ T D a top player, and
Proof. By definition we have that t ∈ U t . Since t is a complete superior of i, it follows that t is a complete superior of any h ∈ U i \ {t}. Suppose not. Then for some h ∈ U i \ {t}, there is a path from a top player t ′ = t to h, and so also a path from t ′ to i, contradicting that t is a complete superior of i. By Lemma 3.1 we have that any h in U i is a complete subordinate of t, and thus h ∈ U t .
Since
So, U t is the union of all sets U i of the complete subordinates of top player t when t has at least one complete subordinate, and U t = {t} otherwise.
The next proposition shows the existence of a subset K ⊆ N such that the subgraph (K, D(K)) is an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure. Proposition 3.3 Let (N, D) be an acyclic permission structure. Then for every t ∈ T D it holds that the subgraph (U t , D(U t )) is an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure with t its unique top node.
Proof. First, when S D (t) = ∅, then U t = {t} and the statement is true. Otherwise, let i be a complete subordinate of t. Obviously t is the unique top-player in the subgraph
) is acyclic and quasi-strongly connected. Acyclicity follows from the acyclicity of D and the fact that D(U i ) ⊆ D. Quasi-strongly connectedness follows from acyclicity of D and the fact that U i is the union of all directed paths from t to i. Then the result follows because
The next lemma states that when N is partitioned in two disjunctive feasible sets, for both sets it holds that the total payoff of its players in every core payoff vector of the restricted game is equal to their own value.
Lemma 3.4 Let A, B ∈ Φ D be two disjunctive feasible coalitions in a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v, D) such that A ∩ B = ∅ and A ∪ B = N . Then x(A) = i∈A a i and x(B) = i∈B a i for every core element x ∈ C(N, r).
Proof. By definition of the restricted game (N, r) and feasibility of A we have that
. Form the second inequality we obtain that that
We now state the final result of this section.
Proposition 3.5 Let (N, D) be an acyclic permission structure and t ∈ T D . Then x(U t ) = i∈U t a i and x(N \ U t ) = i∈N\U t a i for every core element x ∈ C(N, r).
Proof. By definition we have that U t is disjunctive feasible. To show that also N \ U t is disjunctive feasible, consider a player i ∈ N \ U t . Since i = t and i is also not a complete subordinate of t, there is a path from T D \ {t} to i. Hence N \ U t is disjunctive feasible. So, both U t and N \ U t are disjunctive feasible and thus the proposition follows by applying Lemma 3.4 to A = U t and B = N \ U t .
From the Propositions 3.3 and 3.5 it follows that for any t ∈ T D it holds that U t ⊂ N satisfies both properties that (U t , D(U t )) is an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure and j∈U t x j = r(U t ) = j∈U t a j for every x ∈ C(N, r), so also for the nucleolus. This property is now used to compute the nucleolus of the restricted game (N, r) obtained from a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (that is not necessarily quasi-strongly connected) in a finite number of steps. At each step we compute the nucleolus of a smaller additive game with an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure by applying the O(n 4 ) algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) for such games. This algorithm is an adaptation of the algorithm of Arin and Feltkamp (1997) , which computes the nucleolus of veto-rich games in exponential time. Note that permission games with an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure are indeed veto-rich games, which is not true for the ive the algorithm, we introduce one more notation. Let (N, D) be an acyclic permission structure, t ∈ T D be one of the top players and K = N \U t .
Then the set D K ∈ D K on the set of players K is given by
the arcs (i, j) such that j is a successor of top player t or of one of its complete subordinates. Finally, we assume that the players are enumerated (labeled) by the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n in such a way that for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that i < j if (i, j) ∈ D. From the theory on acyclic directed graphs it is well-known that such a enumeration exists. Observe that this assumption implies that node 1 ∈ T D .
Algorithm
Step
Step 2 Consider the non-negative additive game with acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure (
Let r k be the restricted game of (
Step 3.
Step 3 Apply the (polynomial time) algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) (see the appendix) to find the nucleolus of the restricted game
Step 4.
Step 4 If U t k = N k then Stop. Otherwise, goto
Step 5.
Step 5
as the top player in D k+1 with the lowest label (t k+1 ≤ h for every h ∈ T D k+1 ). Consider the set U t k+1 consisting of t k+1 and all its complete subordinates in the graph (N k+1 , D k+1 ). Set k = k + 1 and return to step 2.
The algorithm works
In this section we prove that the algorithm indeed finds the nucleolus of the original nonnegative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v, D). As a first observation, according to Proposition 3.5 it must hold that i∈U 1 Nuc i (N, r) = i∈U 1 a i , so the total payoff i∈U 1 a i assigned in the first iteration of the algorithm to the players in U 1 is indeed equal to the total payoff that the players in U 1 attain at the N uc(N, r). Of course, we still have to prove that the individual payoffs assigned at the first iteration are the individual payoffs for the players in U 1 in Nuc(N, r), and subsequently for the payoffs assigned at any next iteration. This will be proved by using the Davis-Maschler reduced game property. For a game (N, v), let T ⊂ N be a nonempty coalition and x ∈ IR n a payoff vector. Then the Davis-Maschler reduced game on T at x is the game (T, v
Observe that in the definition of the reduced game only the values x j of the players j ∈ N \ T appear.
Property 4.1 Davis-Maschler reduced game property For a game (N, v), let x be the Nucleolus of (N, v). Then for any T ⊂ N it holds that
In the sequel we will denote the characteristic function of the Davis-Maschler reduced game with respect to the nucleolus x = Nuc(N, v) and coalition T ⊂ N just by v ′ , if there is no confusion 6 . Recall that for game v ∈ G N and coalition T ⊂ N, the subgame v T ∈ G T is given by v T (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T . We now have the following proposition with respect to U t for some t ∈ T D . For notational simplicity, in the following we denote U t = K.
Proposition 4.2 For a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v, D)
with |T D | ≥ 2, let t ∈ T D be a top player and K = U t . Then the Davis-Maschler reduced game (K, r ′ ) of the restricted game (N, r) with respect to the nucleolus x ∈ IR n and the set K, coincides with the subgame (K, r K ) of (N, r).
Proof. First, observe that K is feasible and thus r K (K) = i∈K a i . On the other hand r ′ (K) = r(N) − x(N \ K) = i∈N a i − i∈N\K a i = i∈K a i , where the first equality is by definition of the reduced game and the second equality by Proposition 3.5. So, r K (K) = r ′ (K) = i∈K a i .
Next, consider set U ⊂ K. By definition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game we have
We first show that r ′ (U) = r ′ (σ(U)). Therefore it is sufficient to show that for any S ⊆ N \ K it holds that σ(U ∪ S) = σ(σ(U ) ∪ S), because for any S ⊆ N \ K the value of r(U ∪ S) in equation (4.4) is equal to the worth of σ(U ∪ S) in game v. Since σ(U ) ⊆ U , it is evident that σ(σ(U ) ∪ S) ⊆ σ(U ∪ S). Suppose that the inclusion does not hold the other way around, i.e., there exists some player i ∈ σ(U ∪ S) \ σ(σ(U) ∪ S). For this player there is a path p from T D to i consisting of players in σ(U ∪ S) only, and there does not exist a path from T D to i consisting of players in σ(σ(U ) ∪ S) only. Consider a path p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) from T D to i with H(p) ⊆ σ(U ∪ S). We distinguish the following two cases: (i). Suppose that p is a directed path from t to i.
(ii). Suppose that p is a directed path from another top-player t ′ = t to i. Since players in
and so H(p) ⊆ σ(σ(U ) ∪ S). From (i) and (ii) we conclude that σ(U ∪ S) = σ(σ(U ) ∪ S). Hence we have that r ′ (U ) = r ′ (σ(U )) and it remains to prove that r K (U ) = r ′ (U) for any feasible U ⊂ K.
Observe that r K (U) = i∈U a i when U is feasible. To find r ′ (U), we first show that for finding the maximum in (4.4), it is sufficient to consider only sets S such that U ∪ S is feasible. If U ∪ S is not feasible, then
where the first inequality follows from σ(U ∪ S) \ U ⊆ S and σ(U ∪ S) \ U = S if U ∪ S is not feasible. So, in case that U ∪ S is not feasible, replacing set S by set σ (U ∪ S) \ U does not decrease r(U ∪ S) − x(S) in formula (4.4), and thus this expresion is maximized by a coalition S such that U ∪ S is feasible. By definition of r ′ , it now follows that there is some S ⊆ N \ K such that U ∪ S is feasible and
Further, since U ∪ S is feasible and U ⊂ K = U t , we have that also K ∪ S is feasible.
So, by the fact that x ∈ C(N, r), we have that x(K ∪ S) = x(K) + x(S) ≥ i∈K∪S a i . By Proposition 3.5 we have that x(K) = a(K) and thus x(S) ≥ i∈S a i . It follows with equation (4.5) that
From (4.6) and the fact that by definition of the reduced game r ′ (U) ≥ r(U), we conclude that
This proves that r
In the first iteration the algorithm finds the nucleolus of (U 1 , r 1 ). Clearly, the restricted game (U 1 , r 1 ) of (U 1 , v 1 , D 1 ) is equal to the subgame (U 1 , r U 1 ) of (N, r), which is equal to the Davis-Maschler reduced game according to the proposition above. So, with the Davis-Maschler reduced game Property 4.1, the proposition above shows that in the first iteration the algorithm indeed computes the nucleolus payoffs of the players in U 1 in game (N, r). For t ∈ T D and K = N \ U t , the next proposition shows that the DavisMaschler reduced game with respect to the nucleolus and the set K coincides with the game (K, r 2 ), where r 2 is the restricted game of the non-negative game with the reduced acyclic permission structure (K, v K , D K ) on the set of players K, where (K, v K ) is the subgame of (N, v) on K and D K is as given in formula (3.2) for t = 1, i.e., r 2 is the restricted game used in the second iteration of the algorithm. of the restricted game (N, r) with respect to the nucleolus payoff vector x ∈ IR n and the set K, coincides with the restricted game (K, r 2 ) of the non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure
Proof. By definition,
where the first equality is by definition of the reduced game and the second equality by Proposition 3.5. So, r 2 (K) = r ′ (K).
Next, for a set S ⊂ K we consider two cases.
where the second equality follows from v being an additive game and the (last) inequality follows from the nucleolus being a core element. Hence
On the other hand, for all i, j ∈ S we have that
(ii). Secondly we consider the case that P D (S) ∩ U t = ∅. Now, let S ′ ⊆ S be given by
and thus
where the second equality follows by Proposition 3.5. Hence we have that
We now show that this holds with equality. First, recall from the proof of Proposition 4.2 that σ(U ∪ S) = σ(σ(U ) ∪ S) for every U ⊂ U t and S ⊂ K. Hence
so that max U ⊆U t (r(S ∪ U ) − x(U )) will be obtained by a feasible set U . Suppose there exists a feasible U ⊆ U t with r(U ∪ S) − x(U ) > i∈S ′ a i . Then, with S U ⊆ S given by S U = σ(U ∪ S) \ U, it follows in an analogous way as for U = U t above, that σ(U ∪ S) = U ∪ S U , and thus (4.8) where the first inequality follows because U is feasible and the nucleolus lies in the core, and the second inequality because U ⊆ U t and thus
From equations (4.7) and (4.8) it follows that
It remains to prove that also r 2 (S) = v(S ′ ). By definition we have that r 2 (S) =
So, it remains to show that σ K (S) = S ′ .
We first show that
For such a player i there is a path p from T D K to i which only contains elements of S. We consider two cases. If p is a path from a top t ′ ∈ T D , then i ∈ σ(S) ⊆ S ′ . For the case that p is a path from a top
there is a path p ′ from t to t ′ . Hence, the path p ′′ consisting of the path p ′ from t to t ′ and the path p from t ′ to i is a path in
we have that the set of nodes
. So i ∈ σ(U t ∪ S) and we can conclude that
Next we show the reverse that
thus there is path p from T D to i that consists of elements of U t ∪ S. Again there are two
Otherwise, p consists of two subpaths p ′ in U t and p ′′ in S that are connected to each other by a link from the last node of p ′ to the first node of p ′′ . Let j be that last node of path p ′′ that has a predecessor in U t . Then, by construction, j is a top-node in game (K, D K ) and thus the part of p ′′ from j to i is a path
By repeated application of the propositions above it follows that the algorithm of Section 3 computes the nucleolus of (N, r).
Proposition 4.4 For a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v, D), the algorithm described in Section 4 finds the nucleolus of (N, r) within a finite number of iterations.
Proof. In the first iteration the algorithm finds the nucleolus of the restricted game (U 1 , r 1 )
, which is equal to the subgame (U 1 , r U 1 ) of (N, r). By Proposition 4.2 and the Davis-Maschler reduced game property it follows that N uc i (U 1 , r 1 ) = Nuc i (N, r) for all i ∈ U 1 . If U 1 = N , the algorithm ends with the nucleolus in one iteration. Otherwise, the algorithm continues in iteration 2 with the restricted game
By Proposition 4.3 this restricted game is equal to the DM reduced game on N \ U 1 with respect to the nucleolus and so the nucleolus payoffs of the game (N \ U 1 , r 2 ) are equal to the nucleolus payoffs of the players in N \ U 1 in the game (N, r). Repeating the arguments of the first iteration, in the second iteration the algorithm computes the nucleolus payoffs of the game (N \ U 1 , r 2 ) for the players i ∈ U t 2 , which thus is equal to their nucleolus payoffs in the game (N, r). Subsequentially in each iteration k the algorithm computes the nucleolus payoffs of the set of players in U t k . Since the number of players is reduced with at least one in each iteration of the algorithm, the algorithm ends within at most n iterations.
Properties of the algorithm
In this section we first show several properties of the algorithm. From these properties we then obtain an interesting property of the nucleolus of a non-negative additive game with permission structure, namely that each coalition consisting of a free player and its complete subordinates distributes its own value among themselves. A free player is a player that does not have a complete superior.
Definition 5.1 A player i ∈ N in an acyclic permission structure (N, D) is a free player if and only if P D (i) = ∅.
Example 5.2 Consider permission structure (N, D) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and D = {(1, 3), (1, 4) , (2, 4) , (3, 5), (3, 6), (4, 6)}. This permission structure has four free players. Two of them are the two top players 1 and 2. Besides the top players the two other free players are 4 and 6.
In the sequel we denote the set of free players in (N, D) by
Recall from Subsection 2.2 that for every non-top player i, the set P i denotes the collection of all paths from T D to i. For a path p = (i 1 , . . . , i m−1 , i m ) ∈ P i (so i 1 ∈ T D and i m = i), in the sequel H i (p) denotes the set of players H(p) \ {i}, i.e., H i (p) is the set of all players on the path p except player i itself. We now give two lemmas. The first one is obvious and stated without proof.
Lemma 5.3 For every acyclic permission structure (N, D), if j is a (complete) superior of i and k is a (complete) superior of j then k is a (complete) superior of i.
The second lemma states that for any free player i ∈ F D \ T D there exist (at least) two paths p and q in P i such that H i (p) ∩ H i (q) = ∅, i.e., for any non-top free player i there exist two disjunct paths (except for i itself) from T D to i. Recall that it is assumed that the players are enumerated (labeled) by the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n in such a way that for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that i < j if (i, j) ∈ D.
Lemma 5.4 Let (N, D) be an acyclic permission structure and let i be a player in F D \T D . Then there exist (at least) two paths p and q in P i , such that H i (p) ∩ H i (q) = ∅. 
Proof. For any two different paths
highest labeled common node of p 1 and p 2 and (ii) m hk ≥ m for any two paths p h and p k in P i . Since i is a free player, and thus P D (i) = ∅, there is no player j = i that is on all paths in P i . Therefore we must have a third path, say p 3 ∈ P i , such that m ∈ H i (p 3 ).
Because of (ii) we have that m 13 > m and m 23 > m, so for both paths p 1 and p 2 it holds that they have a node in common with p 3 with a higher label than m. For j = 1, 2, define m is node m 1 > m 2 . However, m 14 < m contradicts (ii). So it follows that m = 0, which proves that there exists two paths in P i that only have node i in common.
Recall that in the first iteration player 1 is chosen to be the top and that the nucleolus payoffs of the players in U 1 are computed. In the second iteration the algorithm continues with the non-negative additive game with permission structure
where Lemma 5.5 Let (N, D) be an acyclic permission structure, K = N \ U 1 and D K the permission structure as defined in formula (3.2). Then
Proof. First, observe that U 1 consists of player 1 and all its complete subordinates, so by Lemma 3.1, U 1 does not contain any of the players in F D \ {1}, and thus F D \ {1} ⊆ K.
We first prove that
According to Lemma 5.4, there are two different paths in (N, D) from T D to i. Let p be such a path. We consider two cases. 1. The path p is completely in K and P D (j) ∩ U 1 = ∅ for any j ∈ H(p). Then any link (h, k) ∈ D on the path is also a link in
With A(p) the set of all players in H(p) having a predecessor in U 1 , let k be the player in A(p) such that k ≥ h for all h ∈ A(p), i.e., k is the player in A(p) with the highest label. Then, by formula (3.2), any
It follows that every path p from T D to i in (N, D) gives a path p
. When for some p the path p ′ reduces to the single player path p ′ = (i) (when k = i in case 2), then i becomes a top player in (K, D(K)) and every path from T D to i reduces to the single element i. Otherwise, i has two different paths in (K,
Second, we prove the reverse inclusion that
To do so we show that a node i = 1 which is not free in (N, D) is also not free in ( Proof. The proof follows by repeated application of Lemma 5.5. In iteration 1, player 1 is chosen as top. So, player 1 belongs both to A D and F D . In iteration 2, player t 2 is chosen as top. This player is determined in Step 5 of the previous iteration as the top player with the lowest label in (N 2 , D 2 ) with
Lemma 5.5 this top belongs to
. From repeated application of the lemma it follows that the top t k in iteration k is a top of
is the graph at iteration k. It follows that succeedingly all players of F D are chosen as top in increasing order of their label.
Finally we show that the set of complete subordinates of the chosen top t k in the graph (N k , D k ) in iteration k is equal to the set of complete subordinates of the free player Proposition 5.9 Let (N, v, D) be a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure. Then
From this last proposition we can conclude that for any k ∈ F D , the nucleolus values in the game (N, r) of the players in S D (k) can be computed by applying the algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) 
Complexity of the algorithm
When the structure of the game is known ex ante we can apply Proposition 5.9 and apply the algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) 
Since the complexity of this algorithm is of O(n 4 ), the complexity reduces to O(|F D |a 4 ), where reduces to the additive game, so that every player i gets its own value a i . Typically in practice the structure is not known in advance. Also, although we assumed in the previous sections that the players are enumerated by the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n in such a way that for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that i < j if (i, j) ∈ D, in practice such an enumeration will not be known in advance. So, to perform the algorithm at each iteration k first a top node t k in (N k , D k ) has to be found and its corresponding set U t k of complete subordinates in (N k , D k ). For the complexity of this search, let us consider the first iteration. It is evident that we can find the collection T D of top nodes in at most n 2 actions, because we just have to consider each pair of players once. Then we enumerate the top nodes from 1 to k 1 , where k 1 = |T D | is the number of top nodes in (N, D) . To find the set U 1 of all complete subordinates of top node 1 we can proceed as follows. First, assign label 1 to every successor of node 1. Next, assign label 1 to every successor of every node with label 1 and continu to do this. So, every player in the set S D (1) of subordinates of top player 1 gets a label 1. Clearly, this requires at most O(n 2 ) actions. Next, repeat this procedure for every other top node, so for every player in the set S D (j) of top node j, j = 1, . . . , k 1 . So, a node can receive multiple labels. The set U 1 consists of all nodes that only receive label 1 and can be found in at most k 1 O(n 2 ) < O(n 3 ) actions. In fact this procedure gives in at most O(n
assignment game on N = {1, 2} is given by v({1}) = v({2}) = 0 and v({1, 2}) = a. Note that the restricted game (N, r) on the permission structure
is the same as (N, v) . Clearly, the nucleolus of this game yields an equal division of the surplus, i.e., Nuc(N, v) = Nuc(N, r) = (
). But as soon as there are two or more sellers (say players 1, . . . , n − 1}, such that the buyer (player n) can realize the surplus a with any one of the sellers and cannot generate more surplus by trading with more sellers (for example, the sellers all own one item of a good for which they have reservation value zero, and the buyer wants only one item of the good and is prepared to pay at most a for it) then the characteristic function of the assignment game on N = {1, . . . n} is v(S) = a if n ∈ S and |S| ≥ 2, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Again the restricted game on the permission structure D = {(i, n) | i ∈ {1, . . . n−1} (i.e., the permission structure where all sellers are predecessor of the buyer) is the same as (N, v) . Now, it is clear that N uc n (N, v) = N uc n (N, r) = a and N uc i (N, v) = N uc i (N, r) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . n − 1} since this is the unique Core payoff vector. This also follows immediately from Proposition 5.8 by observing that r is the restricted game of the non-negative additive game with a i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n 1 and a n = a and that player n is a free player in (N, D) and thus receives its own value. So, similar as in a linear Bertrand price competition game, as soon as there is more than one seller, the surplus fully goes to the buyer. (A similar story holds if there is only one seller but more buyers.) Next, we consider an example of a market situation as described above, but buyers and sellers may not be able to trade directly with each other, but need intermediaries to connect them. Example 7.2 Consider a market situation with two sellers (players 1 and 2) and four buyers (players 7, 8, 9 and 10) who cannot trade directly with each other but need intermediaries. Consider the permission structure D on N = {1, . . . , 10} given by D = {(1, 3), (1, 4) , (2, 4) , (2, 5) , (2, 6) , (3, 7), (4, 7), (4, 8), (5, 9), (6, 9), (6, 10)}, see Figure 1 . For every buyer-seller pair that wants to make a deal, it is sufficient to use only one of the intermediaries they are both connected with. For example, for seller 1 and buyer 7 it is necessary and sufficient to use either intermediary 3 or intermediary 4, while seller 1 and buyer 8 need intermediary 4 to trade. Suppose that each seller owns at least four items of the good and each buyer wants one item. Buyer i ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10} is prepared to pay a i > 0 for the item. The reservation value of the sellers and all intermediaries is zero. This can be modelled as the game with permission structure (N, v, D) with N = {1, . . . , 10}, D as given above, and v the non-negative additive game with a i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 6 and a i > 0 for i = 7, . . . , 10, so that v(S) = i∈S a i = i∈S∩{7,8,9,10} a i for all S ⊆ N . The nucleolus of the restricted game (N, r) can be computed using the algorithm of Section 3 and the properties of Section 5. Notice that the players 1 and 2 are top players, and that the set of free players is given by F D = {1, 2, 4, 7}. Using Proposition 5.9 it follows that we can find the nucleolus of (N, r) by considering the four subgames with permission structure given in Figure 2 , namely one subgame for each of the four free players. Figure 2 The nucleoli for the four subgames are as follows.
(those that satisfy the so-called weak digraph monotonicity and weak digraph convexity conditions) we only apply it to non-negative additive games with an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure in step 3 of the algorithm to compute the nucleolus for nonnegative additive games with a (more general) acyclic permission structure. This algorithm computes the nucleolus in O(n 4 ) time. It is an adaptation of the algorithm of Arin and Feltkamp (1997) which computes the nucleolus of veto-rich games in exponential time. In the following, Ω D = Φ D \ {N } denotes the collection of all feasible coalitions not equal to N . Consider a given non-negative additive game with an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure (N, v, D).
Algorithm
Step 1 Set k = 0, U 0 = N, v 0 = v, D 0 = D and r 0 = r. Goto Step 2.
Step 2 Find U k+1 ⊂ U k satisfying τ (U k+1 , r k ) = τ * (r k ) and |U k+1 | = max
where τ * (r k ) = min U∈Ω D k τ (U, r k ) with τ (U, r k ) =
. Assign y j = τ * (r k ) to every player j ∈ U k \ U k+1 . Goto Step 3.
Step 3 If U k+1 = {1} then Goto Step 4. If U k+1 = {1}, let i k+1 be the unique top-player of the subgraph (U k \ U k+1 , D k (U k \U k+1 ) of the digraph (U k , D k ) restricted to U k \ U k+1 . Define game (U k+1 , v k+1 ) by setting for every U ⊆ U k+1 , (7.10) and let r k+1 be the restricted game of (U k+1 , v k+1 , D k+1 ). Set k = k + 1. Goto Step 2.
Step 4 Assign y 1 = v(N) − j∈N\{1} x j . Stop.
